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ABSTRACT
Using an optimizing model we derive the optimal monetary and exchange rate policy for a small
stochastic open economy with imperfect competition and short run price rigidity. The optimal monetary
policy has an exact closed-form solution and is obtained using the utility function of the representative
home agent as welfare criterion. The optimal policy depends on the source of stochastic disturbances
affecting the economy, much as in the literature pioneered by Poole (1970). Optimal monetary policy
reacts to domestic and foreign disturbances. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption
is less than one, as is likely to be the case empirically, the optimal exchange rate policy implies a dirty
float: interest rate shocks from abroad are met partially by adjusting home interest rates, and partially by
allowing the exchange rate to move. This optimal pattern may help rationalize the observed fear of
floating.
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After the exchange rate crises of the last decade many small open economies,
both rich and poor, have adopted ￿exible exchange rates in combination with
some kind of monetary or interest rate rule. Exactly what such a rule should
look like, however, remains very much an open question. In closed economies,
in￿ation-targeting or Taylor-type rules are common, even though the optimality
of such rules is yet to be established analytically. In the open economy, host of
additional tricky issues turn up. Should monetary policy respond systematically
to the nominal or real exchange rate? Equivalently, should the ￿oat be completely
clean or not?
In the prehistory of international macroeconomics (that is to say, in the 1970s),
the answer to most of these questions was clear. The alleged advantage of a ￿exible
exchange rate was that it helped insulate the economy from foreign real shocks.
Behind that protective shield, domestic monetary policy could get on with the task
of stabilizing the domestic economy. Put in the language of the 1970￿s literature,
￿oating gave monetary policy a measure of independence so set interest rates in
order to attain internal balance, while the real exchange rate did much (if not all)
of the work in securing external balance. This is a well known implication of the
Mundell-Fleming model. It is also what most textbook treatments prescribe.
But in recent years this conventional wisdom has become less conventional, and
(according to some) perhaps also less wise. To begin with, there is the empirical
observations that many small countries do not ￿oat the way theory suggests they
should. For instance, in the recent Asian crisis several countries abandoned pegs to
the dollar but then tightened monetary policy in response to adverse shocks, both
internal and external, and attempted to ￿ght the depreciation of their currencies.
In 1997-98 most Latin American countries also used tight money and high interest
rates to prop up their currencies.1 Gavin, Hausmann, PagØs-Serra, and Stein
(1999) and Calvo and Reinhart (2000) have documented this pattern, in what
they call the ￿fear of ￿oating￿ puzzle.
Theoretically, the bene￿ts of exchange rate ￿exibility for small open economies
have also become a subject of contention. One issue is whether high variability
1Things have changed more recently, with Chile and Colombia relaxing monetary policy and
going for a ￿exible exchange rate, with the resulting nominal and real depreciation. Note the
phenomenon is not universal, however, even among small economies: during the Asian crises
Australia and New Zealand allowed their currencies to depreciate sharply and weathered the
storm with little cost in terms of domestic output.in the nominal and real exchange rate (which may also mean high variability in
the terms of trade) is harmful to exports or growth. Another is whether ￿oating
really provides the kind of monetary independence it is supposed to: high volatility
of the nominal and real exchange rate could conceivably cause endemically high
domestic interest rates. A related point has to do with the ability of changes in
nominal exchange rates to aﬀect relative prices: pass-through may be so large and
quick that a depreciation only buys you more in￿ation. And, even more damming,
depreciation could even be contractionary because of negative wealth eﬀects or
because of its harmful impact on the balance sheets of domestic banks and ￿rms.
Faced with these important questions, in this paper we adopt a ￿back to
basics￿ approach. We take a state-of-the-art stochastic macroeconomic model
with sticky prices, adapt it to focus on the behavior of a small open economy,
and use it to characterize optimal monetary and exchange rate policies. Since our
model is built from microfoundations, we can use individual utility functions to
evaluate the welfare consequences of policies, with the optimal policy being that
which delivers the highest expected utility to domestic residents. In this context
we are able to assess how monetary policy should respond to diﬀerent stochastic
disturbances aﬀecting the economy, in an update of the classic literature pioneered
by Poole (1970).
It turns out that the 1970s prescriptions are mostly replicated by this vintage
2001 model. In particular, we show that:
￿ Home interest rates always respond to domestic disturbances: procyclically
in the case of productivity shocks and countercyclically in the case of govern-
ment spending shocks. In doing so, it replicates the behavior of the economy
under ￿exible prices, and attains the corresponding level of welfare.
￿ The optimal exchange rate regime is always one of ￿oating, in that the
nominal and real exchange rates move in response to shocks from abroad.
The direction and size of the optimal responses in home interest rates depend
on parameter values, and most crucially on the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in consumption.
￿ In the empirically relevant case of a small intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution in consumption, the optimal policy involves a dirty ￿oat of the
exchange rate, with the domestic interest rate partially mimicking changes
in world interest rates. This optimal pattern may help rationalize the ob-
served fear of ￿oating in some economies.
2￿ This dirty ￿oat is optimal regardless of whether the foreign central bank
follows its optimal policy or any other arbitrary pattern of responses to its
own domestic shocks.
￿ The alternative policy of permanently ￿xing the exchange rate provokes a
welfare loss that is increasing in the variance of both foreign and domestic
s h o c k s . T h i si sb e c a u s e￿xing imposes two kinds of costs on the domestic
economy: the real exchange is no longer available to cushion shocks from
abroad, and the interest rate (now endogenous and targeted at maintaining
the peg) is no longer available to respond to domestic disturbances.
We carry out the analysis in a model of the ￿new open economy macroe-
conomics￿ tradition brought to life by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995, 1998). The
optimizing, general equilibrium, sticky-price models of this literature lend them-
selves admirably to the analysis of alternative monetary policy rules. Predictably,
there has been a slew of such papers recently.2 Our model diﬀers from much recent
work in the following three dimensions:
￿ It focuses on a small open economy, while most papers ￿with the important
exception of Gal￿ and Monacelli (2000)￿ focus on a world economy composed
of two countries of comparable size.
￿ Like Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (forthcoming) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001a),
but unlike much work in the literature, we obtain closed-form solutions
without resorting to log-linear approximations, and we are able to solve
explicitly for the ￿rst and second moments of the endogenous variables in the
model, so we can study the eﬀects of uncertainty on equilibrium variables.
Our expressions for welfare are also exact, and can be used quite simply to
calculate optimal policies and evaluate alternatives.
￿ We focus on optimal interest rate policies (so we can aﬀord to be agnostic as
to the source of money demand), while most papers have tried to characterize
the optimal behavior of the nominal quantity of money.
In order to make the analysis tractable and get closed-form solutions we as-
sume, in line with the literature, some speci￿c functional forms. Moreover, we
2Aside from those mentioned in the text, a partial list ought to include Monacelli (2001),
Parrado (2001), Benigno and Benigno (2000), Ghironi and Rebucci (2000), Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(2000), and Svensson (2000).
3do not introduce credibility or ￿nancial fragility considerations, which are surely
key in designing optimal monetary and exchange rate policies. We discuss the
importance of such omissions in the concluding section.
Perhaps the closest predecessor of this paper is that by Gal￿ and Monacelli
(2000), who also study interest rate policies in a small open economy. Yet their
framework is diﬀerent: they work with Calvo staggered prices and are forced to
resort to linear approximations to get solutions. Another closely related paper is
by Henderson and Kim (1999), who compute exact utilities and optimal monetary
policies, but for a closed economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a description of the
theoretical model that includes both domestic and foreign shocks. In section 3 we
show how to solve the basic model, while section 4 presents the details of the ￿rm￿s
price setting. Section 5 discusses the structure of monetary policy rules. Section
6 presents a closed-form solution for the welfare function based on the utility
function of the representative agent. Section 7 presents the analysis of optimal
monetary policies in a benchmark case. Section 8 studies the implications of
alternative policy scenarios. The ￿nal section suggests extensions and directions
for future research.
2. The Basic Model
In this model, a home and a foreign economy make up the world. There is measure
n of home agents, each of which has the monopoly in producing a single tradable
good. There is measure n∗ of foreign agents, each of which also produces a good
under monopoly conditions. Thus, n and n∗ indicate both the population size and
t h ee c o n o m i cs i z eo fe a c hc o u n t r y .
2.1. Individual preferences























where δ i st h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e . T h en o t a t i o nEt[xt+j] represents the ex-
p e c t a t i o no fv a r i a b l ext+j conditional on information available at t.
4The variable Y i is output produced by home agent i. We stick to the standard
assumption that he has monopoly rights over this variety, so that he is the sole
producer of the variety in the world economy. This term captures the disutility
the individual experiences from having to produce more output. The stochastic
parameter ￿ κ represents an inverse productivity shock.











αα(1 − α)1−α , (2.2)
where CH,t and CF,t are the quantities that home agents consume of domestic and
foreign goods, respectively, while α indicates the share of home agents￿ consump-
tion of their own good on total consumption.
The two consumption subindexes are symmetric and are de￿ned, as in Dixit
































H,t(j) is the consumption of home variety j by home agent i at time t,
and the same for foreign varieties.
Analogously to Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1998) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001a),
the elasticity of substitution across goods produced within a country is θ>1,
while the elasticity of substitution between the bundles produced by the home
economy and the rest of the world is 1.
Rest-of-the-world agents have identical preferences. Foreign values of the cor-
responding domestic variables will be denoted by an asterisk (∗)a n dm a yd i ﬀer
from home variables. Preferences over consumption of goods are symmetric across
regions, except that foreign residents have a share α∗ home goods in their con-
sumption basket. The rate of time preference δ is the same across countries.
2.2. Prices and demand curve facing each monopolist
Home prices indexes for the two preceding consumption baskets, denoted by PH,t





























The law of one price holds across all individual goods since agents of the home
economy and the foreign economy have identical preferences, so that PH,t (j)=
StP∗
H,t (j), ∀j ∈ [0,n],w h e r ePH,t(j) and P∗
H,t (j) are the prices of home good j in
home and foreign economies, respectively, and St represents the nominal exchange
rate. The same relationship obviously holds for foreign goods.
















Using the de￿nition of total consumption (equation (2.2)), one can derive the












2.3. Asset markets and budget constraints
The typical home agent has access to an internationally tradable bond B∗ denom-
inated in terms of the foreign good and to a domestic bond B denominated in
terms of home money, and held only by domestic residents. His budget constraint,






































t are lump-sum taxes levied by the government. Notice that r∗
t,t h er e a l
interest rate on the foreign bond, is the ￿own￿ rate of return on the foreign good,
and it is the nominal return on the domestic bond. We will assume, without loss
of generality, that in equilibrium the net supply of this domestic bond is zero.
62.4. Fiscal policy
In each country, the government consumes only the local goods, spending equal
amounts in each. So, if Gt is per capita spending, we have
Gt = Gt(j). (2.9)
The government ￿nances the purchases of such goods with lump-sum taxes.








tdi = Gt. (2.10)
In turn, government expenditures are a stochastic proportion of national output:
Yt − Gt = Yte
−γt, (2.11)
where γt is distributed normally with mean zero and variance σ2
γ.












t is distributed normally with mean zero and variance σ2
γ∗.
3. Solving the Model
3.1. The home agent￿s consumption-savings choice
The representative home agent must choose Ci
H,t, Ci
F,t, B∗i
t ,a n dBi
t to maximize
the objective function (2.1) subject to the consumption basket (2.2) and to the
intertemporal budget constraint (2.8). If we let λ
i
t be the corresponding Lagrange



















































Combining the ￿rst two order conditions (3.1) and (3.2) and using the de￿ni-








Now combining this last expression with condition (3.3) and imposing symme-








































Next turn to the determination of nominal interest rates. Combining expres-















Combining equations (3.6) and (3.8) we obtain the Fisher equation linking



































































83.2. Asymmetries between economies and the current account
So far the two countries are symmetric, except in that the home economy produces
measure n of goods and has a share α of home goods in its consumption basket,
while the foreign economy produces measure n∗ of goods and has a share α∗ home
goods in its consumption basket. We now introduce an asymmetry by assuming
that the home economy is small relative to the foreign economy, in the sense that
share of home goods in foreign consumption is negligible (α∗ ˆ 0).3 From now
on we refer to the home economy as the small open economy (SOE) and to the
foreign economy as the rest of the world (ROW).
The assumption of α∗ ˆ 0 implies the following approximation. The foreign
















Next de￿ne the real exchange rate Qt =
StP∗
t
Pt . Using this de￿nition and equa-




































Since now P ∗
t ’ P∗
















































Next consider the current account. As in almost all other papers in this liter-
ature, we focus on the case in which the current account is always zero. This can
3Gal￿ and Monacelli (2000) use the same approximation.
9be motivated in a number of ways, the simplest one of which is the existence of












t = Yt − Gt. (3.18)
3.3. Log-linear versions
Assuming that the natural logarithms of the exogenous variables are jointly nor-
mally distributed,5 we can express the equilibrium conditions in logs. For the sake
of clarity, we de￿ne the natural logarithm of any variable X by x,a n dt h ed a t e
t − 1 unconditional variance of xt, Va r t−1[xt],b yσ2
x.
Taking logs of equation (3.13) we can express the real consumption Euler
equation as a function of endogenous variances:
ρ(Etct+1 − ct)=r
∗












where δ ’ log(1 + δ) and r∗
t ’ log(1 + r∗



















Now turn to the nominal interest rate equations. Taking logs of (3.14) we have
r
∗

















4We suggest an alternative justi￿cation in appendix A.2.
5A variable X is log normally distributed if x = ln(X) ∼ N(µx,σ2
x).T h u s ,i fln(X)=x then
X = ex. In this case E[X]=E[ex]=m(x),w h e r em(x) is the moment generating function for












































t ’ log(1 + i∗
t).
4. Price Setting
Turn now to the problem faced by monopolistic producers in each country, who
must set prices. We ￿rst revisit the demand functions facing each set of producers,
and then solve their respective problems.
4.1. Demand functions revisited
Above we had developed expressions for demand for each good in the home econ-
omy. We now want to manipulate those expressions, plus the corresponding for-
eign demand functions, in order to obtain world demand for each particular vari-









(Yt − Gt)+Gt. (4.1)















we conclude Y d
t = Yt, as it should be.
4.2. The price setters￿ problem
Home agents set prices for period t b a s e do np e r i o dt − 1 information and must
satisfy all the demand at the quoted prices. It follows that the problem of home
11agent i in period t−1 is to choose its price, Pi
H,t, to maximize the expected value


















Maximization of equation (4.4) is subject to budget constraint (2.8) and de-


































































where Et−1 log ￿ κt =0 .


































where Et−1 log ￿ κ∗
t =0 .
5. Specifying Monetary Policy
The alert reader will have noticed that so far money demand has not entered the
model. We could avoid introducing money demand explicitly because we describe
monetary policy entirely in terms of interest rules. This means that, whatever the
shape or form of the money demand function, each central bank lets money supply
12adjust endogenously so that a) the nominal interest rate is equal to the chosen
rate and b) money demand is satis￿ed. We now specify the monetary authority
reaction functions, which specify the setting of such chosen nominal interest rates
at home and abroad.
5.1. Policy rule of the SOE
The monetary authority of the small open economy designs an optimal monetary










where the ψκ and ψγ are the coeﬃcients associated with the domestic shocks while
ψκ∗ and ψγ∗ are the coeﬃcients associated with the foreign shocks. We introduce
the term (PH,t)
ψp,w h e r eψp > 0, following Woodford (1999), Henderson and
Kim (1999) and others, in order to ensure nominal uniqueness in the equilibrium
solution. The formulation implies that the monetary authority raises the nominal
interest rate if the log of the home price level is above a target, set to zero as a
normalization. Notice also that this rule implies that the authorities￿ target rate
of home in￿ation is zero.6 Appendix A.5 shows that under this rule the home
price level is determinate ￿in fact, it is constant and equal to its log target of zero.
This means, given the de￿nition of the overall price level pt,t h a tw ec a ns e tt h e





(Etqt+1 − qt) in what follows.
Taking logs the policy rule becomes
it = i + ψppH,t + ψκκt + ψκ∗κ
∗
t + ψγγt + ψγ∗γ
∗
t, (5.2)
where it ’ log(1 + it), i ’ log(1 + i), κt =l o g ( e κt),a n dκ∗
t =l o g ( e κ
∗
t).
5.2. Policy rule of the ROW

















As in the case of the small open economy, the term (P∗
t )
ψ∗
p∗ ensures that the
foreign price level P∗
t (which, recall, is both the foreign home price level and the
6A non zero rate of in￿ation could easily be introduced, but it adds nothing to our analysis.
13foreign CPI) is both unique and constant. It follows that here the nominal interest
rate i∗
t+1 is equal to the ex ante foreign real interest rate r∗
t+1.


















t ’ log(1 + i∗
t) and i∗ ’ log(1 + i∗).
6. A Closed-Form Solution
Appendix A.4 shows that both economies, home and rest-of-the-world, have a well
de￿ned and unique steady state. In this section we study the behavior of these
economies out of long run equilibrium. It turns out that deviations from steady
state for all variables of interest can be obtained by means of a simple system of
linear equations. For computing that system we use the fact that, since all shocks
are temporary, the expectation today of a variable￿s level tomorrow is invariably
the steady state: Et−1xt = x for any variable x, where variables with no time
subscripts denote the steady state.
Start with equation (3.19), which can be written









(qt − q), (6.1)
so that consumption is above its steady state level whenever the real interest rates












Notice that combining (6.1) and (6.2) one obtains






(qt − q), (6.3)
Next, the balanced current account equation (3.18) gives aggregate demand
for the SOE as





(qt − q) − γt, (6.4)










The nominal interest rate equation for the SOE can be obtained by re-writing








∗ =( it − i)+α
−1 (qt − q), (6.6)








The resulting interest rate parity equation is then




−1 (qt − q), (6.8)
Finally, both policy rules can be written as7

















This completes the description of the system. We have eight independent equa-
tions and eight unknowns, so that the system is fully and uniquely determined.
7. Computing Optimal Policy
7.1. Calculating ex-ante utility
In this section we derive ex-ante utility to get a welfare measure in a closed form.



























Using the condition of optimal price setting (4.5) we can write expected utility
as simply
7We have set the terms ψ
∗
pp∗
t and ψppH,t equal to zero, since that is the value they take in






















where we have imposed symmetry and eliminated the i superscripts.

























7.2. Optimal policy: the case of the ROW
We calculate optimal policy maximizing objective function (7.3) subject to the
equilibrium conditions of the economy, given by equations (6.2), (6.5), (6.7), and
(6.10).
This is done in the following way. From expression (7.3) we see that if we can
compute the expected value and the variance of foreign consumption we have a
closed-form solution for foreign welfare. Maximizing the resulting expression with
respect to the optimal policy coeﬃcients yields the optimal policy rule. That


























































































































7.3. Optimal policy: the case of the SOE
We calculate optimal policy maximizing objective function (7.2) subject to the
equilibrium conditions of the economy, given by equations (6.1), (6.2), (6.4), (6.5),
(6.6), (6.7), (6.9), and (6.10). The procedure is just as in the case of the ROW,
and relies on the fact that, from expression (7.2), if we can compute the expected
v a l u ea n dt h ev a r i a n c eo fh o m ec o n s u m p t i o nw ec a nh a v eac l o s e d - f o r ms o l u t i o n








ρ[1 + v(1 − α)] + αv
,
ψκ∗ =
v (ρ − 1)(1 − α)





v (ρ − 1)(1 − α)




This means that the domestic interest rate rule becomes
it = i + ψppH,t +
ρ
ρ[1 + v (1 − α)] + αv
κt ++
ρ(1 + v)
ρ[1 + v (1 − α)] + αv
γt (7.11)
+
v(ρ − 1)(1 − α)





































































ρ[1 + v (1 − α)] + αv
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7.4. Discussion and interpretation
Appendix A.8 computes the equilibrium of our two economies under ￿exible prices.
It turns out that the two optimal interest rate rules computed above cause the
￿x-price economy to mimic the response of the ￿ex-price economy to real shocks.
This means that utility levels are the same regardless of whether prices are sticky
or not: a properly designed monetary policy manages to attain the economy￿s
second best.8
Both economies react to their domestic ￿productivity￿ disturbances: whenever
κ (or κ∗) is positive, the local central bank raises the local nominal interest rate
in order to reduce demand for the home good and hence allow local producers
to work less when doing so is particularly irksome. Notice that such monetary
policies are procyclical:a f a l l i n κ is a positive productivity shock that under
￿exible prices would elicit greater labor supply; under predetermined prices, the
monetary authority instead engineers an expansionary monetary response that
has the same eﬀect.9
Both economies also react to their ￿demand￿ disturbances: whenever govern-
ment spending γ (or γ∗) is above its steady state level, the local central bank raises
8Not the ￿rst best, of course, because the monopolistic distortion is still there, and there is
nothing monetary policy can do about that.
9Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (forthcoming) make a similar point in the context of a model with two
￿large￿ countries.
19its nominal interest rate to reduce demand for the local good. Such policies are
countercyclical: an increase in demand by the government is oﬀset by a cut in
demand by the local private sector.
The small open economy also chooses to react to foreign shocks, but only
insofar as they are expressed via the foreign real (and nominal) interest rate.
That is to say, ψκ∗ =0if ψ
∗
κ∗ =0 ,a n dψγ∗ =0if ψ
∗
γ∗ =0 . Moreover, the optimal
SOE policy involves a movement of home interest rates in tandem with foreign
rates (ψκ∗ > 0 and ψγ∗ > 0)o n l yi fρ, the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, is larger than one. But if ρ<1, home rates move in the opposite
direction as foreign rates (ψκ∗ < 0 and ψγ∗ < 0). There is no movement of home
interest rates in response to foreign shocks only if ρ is exactly equal to one.
An intuition for these results can be developed in the following way. Using
equation (6.1), (6.4), and (6.6), one can express demand for home output as
yt − y = γt −
1+( 1− α)(ρ − 1)
ρ
(it − i)+






Hence, deviations of home output from its steady state level can be written ex-
clusively as a function of the home and foreign interest rate disturbance and the
local government demand shock. Notice that the foreign ￿scal purchases shock γ∗
t
does not enter this expression: it matters for the determination of foreign output,
but not of foreign consumption demand.10
T h es i g no ft h ee ﬀect of foreign interest rates on domestic demand depends on
whether the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ρ is larger or smaller than one.
This is because a fall in foreign interest rates has two eﬀects on domestic aggregate
demand: it increases foreign consumption of all goods and it also appreciates the
real exchange rate (q tends to fall) switching demand away from domestic goods.
One channel increases demand for home goods, and the other reduces it. If ρ>1,
as is likely to be the case empirically, a fall in foreign interest rates causes a fall
in home demand, calling in turn for a cut in home interest rates to stabilize home
demand and output. With unitary elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign goods and across time periods (ρ =1 ), it turns out that the two eﬀects
cancel each other, so that shocks to the foreign interest rate have a null impact
on foreign demand for home goods.
What kind of an exchange rate regime does the optimal policy imply? If ρ
is exactly one, foreign interest rate shocks call for no reaction by domestic rates,
10Recall that each government consumes local goods only.
20so the policy is a clean ￿oat. In this case, since the foreign interest rate does
not aﬀect home demand, domestic monetary policy can be targeted at oﬀsetting
domestic shocks only.
If ρ<1, home and foreign interest rates move in opposite directions, so given
arbitrage ￿as it appears in equation (6.8)￿ nominal and real exchange rate move a
great deal in response to foreign ￿nancial shocks. This is a case of love of ￿oating.
Finally, if ρ>1, local rates mimic, but only partially, the movement in foreign
rates. This follows from the fact that the term
v(ρ−1)(1−α)
ρ[1+v(1−α)]+αv in the bottom two
cells of (7.10), which is the ratio of the movement in domestic and foreign interest
rates in response to foreign shocks, is smaller than one. In this case the optimal
policy is dirty ￿oat. This case, which is probably the empirically relevant one, can
help rationalize the observed fear of ￿oating mentioned in the introduction.
These results can be summarized in the following way. Expressions (6.6) and
(6.7) can be rewritten to yield
qt − q = α[(i
∗
t − i
∗) − (it − i)], (7.17)
so that, when only foreign shocks occur,

























where the term in curly brackets is positive and decreasing in ρ.S ot h el a r g e ri s
ρ, the smaller is the reaction of the nominal and real exchange rates to the foreign
shocks.
8. Alternative Policy Scenarios
In this section we study alternative international scenarios in which domestic
policy may have to be conducted, and one alternative domestic rule-of-thumb
policy: a ￿xed exchange rate.
8.1. No optimal policy abroad
So far we have assumed the ROW central bank follows an optimal policy. What
if that is not the case? Does this mean that the home country coeﬃcients are no
longer optimal?
21We know the optimal foreign policy is given by (7.5). Consider now the fol-



















where φκ∗ and φγ∗ are any two real numbers. Of course, if φκ∗ = φγ∗ =1 ,t h e n
the foreign central bank is following optimal policies. Appendix A.9 shows that in
this case the optimal SOE monetary policy is unchanged. The diﬀerence between







































































ρ(1 + v)(1− α)


















ρ(1 + v)(1− α)




















[ρ[1+v(1−α)]+αv](ρ+v)2. Therefore, the loss in utility associated with non-
optimal foreign monetary policy is increasing in the variance of foreign shocks,
and in the distance between the φ￿s and their ￿optimal￿ level of one.
What is going on here? Two things. The ￿rst is that, without the optimal
policy in place, foreign output is more variable, and foreign producers protect
themselves against that variability (and the cost of possibly having to provide a
lot of labor services when it is irksome to do it), by setting higher prices. As a
result, steady foreign output drops. Given the fact that q =
αρ
α+(1−α)ρ (y − y∗),t h i s
means that the steady state real exchange rate depreciates and the terms of trade
turn against the home country. This reduces SOE utility.
The second key observation is that there is nothing that the home central bank
can do about this unwelcome development. Given that the ROW is large relative
to the SOE, home monetary authorities cannot in￿uence output variability abroad.
And since foreign demand shocks do not aﬀect home demand (once temporary
22movements in the real exchange rate are accounted for), the SOE central bank
should not be trying to counteract those either.
8.2. A ￿xed exchange rate
What are the welfare consequences of ￿xing the exchange rate? Clearly, since
in this model a ￿x is not the welfare-maximizing policy, utility must be lower.
But how much lower? What does the diﬀerence depend on? These are important
questions, since hard exchange rate pegs are alleged to have other virtues: they
are simple, credible, and may serve to promote economic and political integration.
Those bene￿ts could conceivable more than oﬀset the macroeconomic costs, if the
latter are suﬃciently low.
Under a ￿xed exchange rate, SOE monetary policy becomes endogenous, with
interest rates adjusting to keep the real exchange rate Qt equal to its steady state
level Q. Appendix A.10 shows that in that case the diﬀerence between second-best
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where ∆ = α
ρ[1+v(1−α)]+αv > 0. Thus, the loss in utility associated with ￿xing is
increasing in the variance not only of foreign shocks, but also domestic shocks.
This is because ￿xing imposes two kinds of costs on the domestic economy: the
real exchange is no longer available to cushion shocks from abroad, and the interest
rate (now endogenous and targeted at maintaining the peg) is no longer available
to respond to domestic disturbances.
239. Limitations and extensions
Rather than restating our conclusions, here we discuss their limitations and sug-
gest directions for future research. The omission of all issues having to do with
credibility and ￿nancial fragility is also important. Dealing with the former is,
in principle, easy. Here we have focused on ex ante optimal monetary policies,
and have therefore swept aside the issues that would arise if government could
reoptimize ex post (that is, after prices have been set). Because monopolistic
competition here renders equilibrium output levels too low, a problem of time
inconsistency would occur, possibly leading to ineﬃciently large movements in
the nominal and real exchange rates. Such a ￿depreciation￿ bias under ￿oating
could be costly, rendering the policy inferior to other simple rules such as credible
￿xing. But notice: as Corsetti and Pesenti (2001a) and others have stressed, in
models such as these a surprise devaluation also entails a surprise drop in the
terms of trade. Therefore, myopic policy makers need not be subject to the same
in￿ation/devaluation bias that aﬀects them in the closed economy, and hence time
inconsistency problems need not erase the welfare superiority of ￿exible exchange
rates.
Regarding ￿nancial fragility and imperfect ￿nancial markets, one of us has
explored their importance for the design of monetary and exchange rate policies
in a small open economy. See CØspedes, Chang, and Velasco (2000 and 2001).
In that work we discuss dollarized liabilities and endogenous risk premia arising
from costly state-veri￿cation, as in Bernanke and Gertler (1989). The bottom
line of that work is that such ￿nancial imperfections may be very important in
determining how severe and costly is the domestic adjustment to adverse external
shocks. But ￿exible exchange rates, even in the presence of dollar liabilities, can
help cushion the unwanted eﬀects of such shocks.
24A. Appendices
A.1. Real exchange rate and prices: some identities
De￿ne the real exchange rate as Qt =
StP∗
t
Pt . The general price level of home and













Applying natural logs to these four equations and introducing one of the key
assumptions of the model ￿that is assuming that the share of home goods in the
consumption basket of the foreign country is negligible￿ we get the following set
of equations:
qt = st + p
∗
t − pt, (A.1)












Combining all four equations we can obtain an expression for the real exchange
rate as a function of the terms of trade
qt = α(st + p
∗
t − pH,t). (A.2)
Using the previous relationships we can get the following variances and covariances
used in the main text:
σ
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As mentioned in the main text, one way to insure that the current account
is always zero is to assume the existence of complete markets. Another one,
25sketched in what follows, relies on assuming an extreme asymmetry between the
two economies.
Recall that SOE is composed by individuals with measure n,w h om a k ea l s o
n goods, while ROW is composed by individuals with measure n∗,w h om a k en∗







t = nPH,t(Yt − Gt), (A.4)
n(1 − α)PtCt + n

























n∗PH,t(Yt − Gt), (A.6)
n
















Now introduce two assumptions: i) α∗ ’ 0 and ii) n
n∗ ’ 0.U s i n g t h e s e












Therefore, the ROW current account is zero.
Next, adding the two market clearing conditions and plugging (A.8) in this
relation we have an analogous condition for SOE
PtCt = PH,t(Yt − Gt), (A.9)
so that naturally the home current account is also zero. Finally, using the de￿-
nitions of the real exchange rate and the domestic price level in this last result
yields equation (3.18) in the text.
A.3. Demand functions
Plugging equation (2.7) into equation (2.6), it follows that the home demand for


























Ct j ∈ [0,n
∗].







































t j ∈ [0,n
∗].
We are interested in the demand for home goods. Adding up the corresponding
expression in (A.10) and (A.11), using weights of n and n∗ respectively, plus Gt(j)
































t (j) ≡ nCH
t (j)+n∗CH∗
t (j)+Gt(j) is total world demand for good j



































Plugging this into (A.13) leads to (4.1) in the text.
27A.4. Steady state
Let variables without time subscripts denote steady state values. In that state,
equation (3.19) becomes
r












where δ ’ log(1 + δ) and r∗ ’ log(1 + r∗), while equation (3.20) is
r

















































With sticky prices in the foreign country, σ2
p∗ = σc∗p∗ =0 ,s ot h a tw eh a v e
i
∗ = r










t, it follows that σ2
c∗ = σ2
y∗ + σ2
γ∗,s ow eh a v e
i
∗ = r












Plugging (A.20) in (A.18), the steady state domestic nominal interest rate must
be















































σcq,w eh a v e






























































Finally, subtracting (A.25) from (A.21) we get
i











































σcq (ρ − 1).
Next, turn to the determination of relative prices and consumption in steady
state. Equations (4.7) and (4.8) in the text, reproduced and rearranged here for





































































































Next, using the fact that c − c∗ = 1











Plugging this result in (A.29) we arrive at



































where ∆ = α
ρ[1+v(1−α)]+αv >0.Finally,computec=y∗+1































































A.5. Pinning down the home price level
Combining equations (3.19) in the text and (A.15) we get















But from the de￿nitions of p and q i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t
















Next recall that the monetary policy rule is


























































Taking expectations of this equation as of t−1, recalling that all shocks have zero
mean and that therefore home output and the real exchange rate are expected to
be at its steady state value in all future periods, this expression becomes
Et−1pH,t=0.(A.39)
Notice ￿nally that since pH,tispre-setasoft−1,Et−1pH,t=pH,t=0.

































31Taking expectations of this expression as of t we have EtpH,t+1 =0 .W e
conclude that EtpH,t+1 − pH,t =0for all t. An analogous computation must be
carried out to pin down the foreign price level.
A.6. Optimal policy in the ROW

























Plugging the log version of equation (2.12) into the previous equation we can

































































































































































coeﬃcients in (7.4) in the text.
A.7. Optimal policy in the SOE























Plugging the log version of equation (2.11) into the previous equation we can
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Next, combining equations (6.1), (6.3), and (6.6) we have









33ct − c = −
α
ρ







Finally, using both policy rules we get
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in (7.10) in the text.
A.8. The ￿ex-price solution
With ￿exible prices, price-setting equations (4.5) and (4.6) must hold, but not


















































































Next, using ct = c∗
t + 1


























































































































































Do the optimal policies under sticky prices mimic the behavior of the ￿exible
price economy? Start with the easier case of the ROW. Taking logs of (7.5) we
















movements of consumption are the same as in under ￿exible prices.
Next, do the same for the SOE. The optimal policy (7.11) in logs turns out
to be:
it − i =
ρ






v(ρ − 1)(1 − α)






v(ρ − 1)(1 − α)







ct − c = −
α
ρ







Finally, plugging (6.6) in the text into this last expression we get
ct − c = −
α
ρ[1 + v(1 − α)] + αv
κt −
α
ρ[1 + v(1 − α)] + αv
(1 + v)γt (A.70)
−
(1 + v)(1− α)






(1 + v)(1− α)






We conclude that in the SOE, too, ￿xed-price movements in consumption mimic
the movements in a ￿ex-price economy if the optimal interest rule is used.
37What about utility? Expressions (7.2) and (7.3) for welfare still hold, regard-
lessofwhetherpricesare￿xedor￿exible.Using(A.63)and(A.62)inthoseone
can check that utility under ￿exible prices is the same as utility with ￿xed prices




























































sumption, and then home utility as a function of both home and foreign policy
coeﬃcients. Thus, maximizing expected utility with respect to the home policy
coeﬃcients we get the same result described in equation (7.11) above. With that
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A.10. A ￿xed exchange rate























If, for simplicity, we assume that the ROW central bank follows its optimal
policy,(A.73)and(A.74)togetheryield























Substituting these equations into (4.5) we obtain







































Clearly, since the foreign central bank follows optimal policies, ROW steady
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ρ[1 + v(1 − α)] + αv
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